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Abstract 
In this research, we aim to understand the influence of government subsidies on 
enterprises' research and development (R&D) investment behavior, particularly in 
China’s renewable energy sector. We are also interested in examining how the 
attributes of enterprise ownership act as a moderating variable for the relationship 
between government subsidies and R&D investment behavior. Three classical panel 
data analysis models including the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model, the 
fixed effect model and the random effect model are employed. We find that 
government subsidies have a significant crowding out influence on enterprises' R&D 
investment behavior and that the influence is further moderated by the attributes of 
enterprise ownership. Moreover, a panel threshold regression model is used to 
demonstrate how the influence of government subsidies on enterprises' R&D 
investment behavior will change when government subsidies increase. Two thresholds, 
0.6% and 10.1%, are identified. We recommend that relevant government 
departments should motivate enterprise R&D investment behavioral intention by 
increasing subsidies within a certain range. Different attributes of enterprise 
ownership should also be considered as part of policy reform and re-structuring 
relating to government subsidies. 
Keywords: renewable energy, enterprise, government subsidy, ownership, R&D 
investment, threshold effect. 
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1. Introduction  
The G7 countries have formulated a series of policies to support firms in the 
renewable energy industry. For example, U.S. President Obama released an ambitious 
2016 Federal Government Budget Proposal to invest $7.4 billion in clean energy 
technology programs across all agencies (Laporte, 2015). Japan and the European 
Commission also published relevant policies and national programs to help renewable 
energy firms achieve sustainable development (see EU renewable energy policy, 
2015). Consequently, fierce international energy competition and a quick increase in 
China’s domestic energy demand have drawn the attention of various Chinese 
government departments including the State Council of China, the Bureau of Energy 
and The Ministry of Environmental Protection of China. The Chinese central 
government has recently urged these departments to collaborate together to consider 
various policies and specific measures for promoting the development of renewable 
energy.  
Since the Renewable Energy Law of the People's Republic of China was enacted 
in 2005, the Chinese government announced a series of subsidy policies to boost the 
renewable energy industry (Shen and Luo, 2015). Generally speaking, government 
subsidies may be offered through direct or indirect supporting approaches in terms of 
funding allocation, such as VAT returns, fiscal subsidies, tax incentives for innovation, 
price control, demand assurance and compulsory allocation (Zhang et al., 2014; Shen 
and Luo, 2015). Moreover, government can set up specified subsidies for different 
industries and at business development stages, such as subsides for the development 
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of renewable energy technologies. In this research, the term “government subsidies” 
mainly refers to public R&D research funding granted by Chinese central and local 
government departments for enterprises to develop new technologies of renewable 
energy and relevant innovative activities. This is our research focus because we 
believe that the development of emerging and cutting-edge renewable energy 
technologies plays a pivotal role in ensuring green, sustainable, renewable energy 
development. Recent studies show that the average research and development (R&D) 
intensity of international renewable energy enterprises is higher than that of Chinese 
listed renewable enterprises. The average research and development (R&D) intensity 
of Chinese listed renewable enterprises is only 0.76% and so the main barrier for 
R&D and innovation in the renewable energy industry in China is cost (Costa-Campi 
et al., 2014).  
    Despite the growing significance of government subsidies in solving the shortage 
of private R&D investment of renewable energy enterprises, there is limited 
understanding of the impact of government subsidies on renewable energy enterprises’ 
behavioral intention to strengthen R&D at the micro-level. A systematic literature 
review of prior studies on renewable energy development and government subsidies 
was undertaken that resulted in the identification of a research gap. Existing research 
on renewable energy development has mainly focused on exploring various energy 
policy instruments and the effect of portfolio standards on climate and energy industry 
development in developed countries and regions, such as the United States (Menyah 
and Wolde-Rufael, 2010; Roe et al., 2001; Bang, 2010) and the European Union 
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(Jacobsson et al., 2009; Haas et al., 2004; Reiche and Bechberger, 2004). We contend 
that such findings may not be the same for China. A few other researchers have 
further examined the potential macroeconomic influence of renewable energy policies 
on the energy industry in developing countries (e.g., Zhang et al., 2009Wang et al., 
2010; Cherni and Kentish, 2007; Zhao et al., 2011). As noted earlier, due to the lack 
of understanding of the exact effect of government subsidies on enterprises’ intention 
to strengthen R&D investment at the micro level, it is still unclear how the R&D level 
of firms with government subsidies is to be compared with that of firms without 
government subsidies. Specifically we want to know if the relationship between 
government subsidies and enterprises’ intention to strengthen R&D investment is 
linearly correlated and if government subsides complement or substitute private R&D 
investment. These two questions have important implications for the implementation 
of appropriate policies of government subsidies in developing countries. There is a 
dearth of literature investigating the above-mentioned issues.  
    In this study, we address the gap in prior research by investigating the influence 
of government technology development subsidies on enterprises’ R&D investment 
behavior, focusing on China’s renewable energy sector. Moreover, we are also 
interested in examining how the attributes of enterprise ownership moderate the 
relationship between government subsidies and enterprises’ R&D investment behavior. 
Unlike renewable energy enterprises in developed countries, Chinese renewable 
energy enterprises inherently have different types of ownership due to the unique 
institutional environment and political background. The amount of government 
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subsidies acquired by renewable energy manufacturers with different attributes of 
ownership may vary greatly. Specifically, the more a company has a close 
relationship with the Chinese central government, the more financial support this 
company can obtain. In addition, we further examine how these factors – including 
government subsidies, enterprise ownership attributes, and political connections of 
enterprise owners – work together and demonstrate an interactive effect on enterprise 
R&D investment.  
    Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical 
foundation for the study. The third section describes the research methodology 
employed in the investigation. Section 4 provides the results of our data analysis and 
this is followed by a summary of our research findings in section 5. The final section 
rounds off with a discussion of the contributions and policy implications of our 
research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section we consider government subsidies for renewable technology 
development, their impact on private enterprises, and the influence of firm ownership. 
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2.1. Government subsidies for renewable energy technology development 
The effect of government subsidies for technology development has been extensively 
examined in prior studies from different aspects, such as increasing the rate of green 
innovation (Johnstone et al., 2010; Aalbers et al., 2013), improving the value of 
renewable power technologies (Davis and Owens 2003), promoting the market 
diffusion of a niche renewable energy technology (Bointner, 2014) and increasing 
international trades and domestic R&D (Kim and Kim, 2015).  
  
2.2. Differential effect of government subsidies on enterprises’ private R&D 
investment 
Prior studies show that the actual effect of government subsidies on improving 
enterprise private R&D investment considerably varies across industries. For instance, 
Arias and van Beers (2013) found a negative relationship between government 
subsidies and some renewable energy firms’ R&D in terms of the amount of 
renewable energy technology inventions and patents, particularly those related to the 
solar and wind renewable energy sector. Saul’s (2002) empirical data from Israeli 
manufacturing enterprises in the 1990s indicated that firms were more like to increase 
their private R&D investment over the long-term provided that they could 
concurrently obtain funding from the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade. In other 
words, government subsidies should be viewed as an alternative funding source 
instead of replacing enterprises’ private R&D investment (Koga, 2005). Interestingly, 
some studies found inconsistent empirical findings where government subsidies have 
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a negative (i.e. crowding-out) (Goolsbee, 1998; Kelette et al., 2000) or limited effect 
(Wallsten, 2000) on enterprises’ private R&D investment. Moreover, some elements 
of context (e.g., the background of industries and country characteristics) have a 
moderating effect on the relationship government subsidies and enterprises’ private 
R&D investment (Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 
2007). 
 
2.3. Ownership influence on enterprises’ R&D activities and subsidies received 
During the economic transition process over the past two decades, China has formed a 
special institution in which company ownership characteristics directly affect their 
R&D performance and subsequent innovation activities. Compared with other kinds 
of enterprises (e.g., private enterprises), state-owned enterprises even stress how to 
innovate effectively and efficiently because they have huge political resources that are 
rather useful for obtaining government subsidies (Yu et al., 2010; Wu and Liu, 201 
and Wu et al., 2012). 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Research design 
We chose to conduct longitudinal research to examine the delayed effect of 
government subsidies on enterprises’ private R&D investment behavior. Such a 
longitudinal analysis design will allow us to identify and compare the influence of 
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government subsidies on enterprises private R&D investment behavioral intention at 
different stages (Doh and Kim, 2014; Lee and Cin, 2010; David et al., 2000). In this 
research, we decided to introduce a lag variable demonstrating the effect of 
government subsidies within 0 to 1 year. Specifically, private R&D investment in year 
t is influenced by government subsidies in previous years: t, t-1 and t-2. We 
hypothesize that government subsidies should have a direct effect on enterprises’ 
behavioral intention to increase R&D investment during the first and second 
half-years after they obtain funding. As noted earlier, prior studies employing 
different research methods found that the effect of government subsidies on 
enterprises R&D investment varies. For example, linear regression methods have been 
extensively employed to examine the effect of government subsidies on motivating 
enterprises’ private R&D investment (Wolff and Reinthaler, 2008). We argue that 
such linear regression methods ignore the moderating role of subsidy intensity on the 
relationship between government subsidies and enterprises’ private R&D investment 
behavioral intentions. Therefore, we adopt the panel threshold regression (PTR) 
method proposed by Hansen (1999) to examine the threshold effect of subsidy 
intensity on moderating the relationship between government subsidies and 
enterprises’ private R&D investment.  
Traditional methods employed by prior studies more or less assume that 
government subsidies are randomly allocated to all eligible enterprises. However, this 
is not always the case, because policymakers often determine the allocation model of 
government funding resources. The amount of subsidies for a firm will be 
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significantly influenced by the firm’s ownership attributes and political background. 
In order to explore the interactive role of government subsidies, we employ a 
semiannual panel dataset over the period from June 2009 to December 2014. A panel 
data regression is carried out to examine how government subsides influence an 
enterprise’s intention to increase private R&D investment toward a positive (i.e. 
complementary) or negative (i.e. crowding-out) effect. In addition, government 
subsidies usually demonstrate a lagged effect on a firm’s innovative activities and 
R&D investment. For that, we add a lag variable for government subsidies in the 
model in this study (see section 3.3 for the full model). Moreover, in order to ascertain 
how Chinese market characteristics and the institutional environment influence the 
relationships among firm ownership attributes, firm types and government subsidies, a 
threshold regression model is developed for non-dynamic panels with 
individual-specific fixed-effects. In this research, we use this model to examine the 
differential effects of government subsidies on enterprises’ private R&D investment 
under different subsidy intensities. A time frame is chosen due to limited high quality 
data resources. This time frame demonstrates key phases of the development of 
domestic renewable industries supported by the Chinese government. 
 
3.2. Data 
Data was collected from renewable energy enterprises listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Through semiannual panel data collection over the period 
from June 2009 to December 2014, relevant information on private R&D investment 
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and the amount of government subsidies for renewable energy enterprises were 
provided by Wind Information Co. Ltd (Wind Info1), located in the Lujiazui Financial 
Center in Shanghai. Wind Info. is a leading integrated service provider of financial 
data, information, and software. Data with missing key values were removed and 172 
completed cases were finally collected. Moreover, we only consider enterprises that 
have received subsidies for at least twelve consecutive half-years to examine the 
differential effect of government subsidies on enterprises’ private R&D investment. 
As a result, the financial data for 147 renewable energy enterprises was finally used in 
our study.  
Background information on firms, ownership characteristics and types of actual 
firm owners were manually collected from company annual reports. A further 
triangulation was carried out based on information found on the official websites of 
enterprises. All estimations were calculated using Stata 11. 
 
3.3. Panel Regression Model 
Our panel regression model is given in equation 1. In this section we will explain the 
model. 
 
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 2 1 ,
2 , 3 , 4 , 1 2
1 , 1 2 , 2 3 , ,
&
* * *
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i i t
R Dput GS GS GS income
topshare roa scalenum CT PR
GS CT GS CT GS PR u
α α α β
β β β χ χ
φ φ φ ε
− −
− −
= + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
       （1） 
                                                             
1Wind Info. has built up a substantial, highly-accurate, first-class financial database, which includes stocks, funds, 
bonds, FX, insurance, futures, derivatives, commodities, and macroeconomic and financial news. Moreover, 
institutional investors can acquire the latest information via regular updates provided by Wind Info. 
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3.3.1. Dependent variable 
 
represents the private R&D investment of enterprise i in the period t. 
Private R&D investment refers to R&D staff’s innovative ideas, information and other 
intangible elements, which are difficult to accurately measure. However, enterprises 
have to spend considerable funding to ensure these subjective elements. Thus, private 
R&D investment may be viewed as an indicator of the relative strength of enterprises 
R&D spending. Prior studies on measuring private R&D investment usually use the 
amount of R&D expenditure of enterprises during a certain period as a dependent 
variable. 
 
3.3.2. Explanatory variables 
,i tGS
 
represents the amount of government subsidies of enterprise i in the period t; 
, 1i tGS −
 
and
 
, 2i tGS −
 
represent the amount of government subsidies of enterprise i in 
the t-1 and t-2 lagged periods, respectively. Data on government subsides for new 
technology development and transfer were empirically obtained from listed 
enterprises’ semi-annual reports. 
 
refers to the amount of business income 
of enterprise i in the period t; refers to shares of the largest shareholder of 
enterprise i in the period t; represents the return on assets of enterprise i in the 
period t, which includes return on total assets, return on total core assets, return on net 
assets and return on total net worth; represents the total number of staff of 
enterprise i in the period t.  
   The criteria for identifying these variables are as follows:  
R&Dputit
,i tincome
,i ttopshare
,i troa
,i tscalenum
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(1) Considering the effect of government subsidies on the private R&D investment is 
usually delayed, we thus introduced , 1i tGS −  and , 2i tGS −  into the panel model, to 
capture a lagged effect as they have been used in previous studies (Antonelli & Crespi, 
2013; Montmartin & Herrera, 2015; Colombo et al., 2013);  
(2) The amount of firms’ private R&D investment is usually influenced by firm scale. 
Researchers often find that firms with a large scale have a risk-taking attitude, and are 
willing to add to R&D investment. Thus, we introduced the variable  into 
the panel model; 
(3) The amount of R&D private investment is usually constrained by annual income 
and Return on Assets (ROA), both of which we assume have a positive effect on R&D 
private investment. Thus, we introduced these two variables,  and , 
into the panel model; and 
(4) The share of the largest shareholder reflects capital centralization and the 
efficiency of resource allocation. We estimate that over-centralization of the capital 
will negatively influence private R&D investment. Thus, we introduced a variable 
called into the panel model. The definitions of the variables are show in 
Table 1. 
 
                           Please Insert Table 1 in Here 
 
,i tscalenum
,i tincome ,i troa
,i ttopshare
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3.3.3. Interaction terms 
In this model, we identify three interactions among government subsidies, lagged 
government subsidies, enterprise ownership attributes, and owners’ political 
connections. We believe that firm ownership characteristics and owners’ political 
connections affect the amount of subsidies they can obtain from the Chinese 
government. In addition, the willingness of renewable energy enterprises to increase 
private R&D investment in China depends on their political resources to some degree. 
We use a dummy variable, CT, to indicate the degree of owners’ political connections 
based on their background scored on a 7-point Likert scale with a score of 7 
indicating ‘the strongest political connections’ and a score of 1 indicating ‘the weakest 
political connections’. Another dummy variable, PR, refers to a set of legal rights of a 
firm and its possession of assets (Claessens et al., 2008; Marcelin and Mathur, 2015). 
This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a firm is state-owned and 0 otherwise. 
refers to an “enterprise individual effect” including entrepreneurship, innovation 
background and motivation.  indicates error terms. 
 
3.4. Threshold regression model 
Our threshold regression model is shown in equation 2. 
   （2） 
We hypothesize that the relationship between government subsidies and 
enterprises’ intentions to add private R&D investment is unlikely to be a linear 
relationship. Specifically, we ask: (1) Is there an optimal interval for the supporting 
iu
,i tε
0 1 , 1 2 , 1& (Support ) (Support )it i t it i t it it itR Dinput GS I r GS I r xα α α θ ξ− −= + ∗ ≤ + ∗ > + +
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degree of government subsidies? and (2) Is there a crowding-out or incentive effect on 
the relationship between government subsidies and enterprises’ R&D investment as 
the amount of government subsidies change? We assume that there is a threshold level 
of r, and the effect of government subsidies on improving enterprises’ R&D activities 
will change significantly when the amount of government subsidies (Supportit) is 
more than r. We introduce a dummy variable called . When , =1; 
otherwise, =0. We define , of which, is an indicative 
function. If ，then  takes value 1, otherwise it is 0. 
In the threshold regression model, variable i represents an enterprise i and variable 
t represents the time period. Support is a threshold variable and r is a specific 
threshold value. Variable x is a set of controlling variables including the number of 
total staff, business income, return on assets, shares of the largest shareholder, 
enterprise ownership attributes, and owners’ political connections; and
respectively refer to the influence ratio of explanatory variables by explained 
variables of threshold variables when and .  
refers to stochastic disturbance. It is noted that although our threshold model only 
includes one threshold value, two or more threshold values possibly exist in practice. 
In this research, we set a double threshold regression model as: 
 
   (3)
 
In function <  we argue that multiple threshold models can be further 
developed based on the above single and double threshold models.  
 
Dit Supportit ≤ r Dit
Dit It (r) = Supportit ≤ r{ } I (*)
Supportit ≤ r I (*)
α1 α 2
Supportit Supportit ≤ r Supportit > r ξit
0 1 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 2
3 . 1 2
& (Support ) ( Support )
( )
it i t it i t it
i t it it it
R Dinput GS I r GS I r r
GS I Support r x
α α α
α θ ξ
− −
−
= + ∗ ≤ + ∗ < ≤
+ ∗ > + +
r1 r2
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4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive statistical analysis 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Means, 
standard deviations, maximum and minimum values are summarized for all variables 
in Table 3. Pairwise correlation coefficients with significance levels are also provided. 
Moreover, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are used to examine bias estimates 
derived from multicollinearity, where two or more variables in a multiple regression 
model are highly correlated. Under this situation, the coefficient estimates of multiple 
regressions may change in response to a small change. We computed the VIFs and 
found most to be around 2 and less than the conservative threshold of 5. The 
computed VIFs suggest that multicollinearity was not a major issue in our study. 
  Please Insert Table 2 in Here 
Please Insert Table 3 in Here 
 
4.2. Regression analysis 
According to the basic model (1), we implemented a regression analysis based on 
panel data for new energy enterprises from 2009 to 2014 as shown in Table 4. A 
Hausman test was carried out (p=0.0243) and indicated that a fixed effect model 
should be adopted. 
Please Insert Table 4 in Here 
A White’s (1980) test for heteroscedasticity showed positive results (p<.001). 
Thus, compared with a fixed effects model, a heteroscedasticity robust model could 
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provide a more accurate estimation of the relationship between government subsidies 
and the private R&D investment of energy enterprises.  
As shown in Table 4, the coefficient for government subsidies and enterprises’ 
private investment in the current period is -0.038. This result means that if the 
government increases subsidies by 1%, renewable energy enterprises are likely to 
reduce their private R&D investment by 0.038%. Moreover, a lagged crowding-out 
effect was found at the 1% level of significance. An increase in government 
subsidies by 1% will lead to 0.66% and 1.098% reductions in private R&D 
investment during periods t-1 and t-2 respectively. Such a significant lagged 
crowing-out effect means that Chinese renewable energy firms are not willing to take 
risks in initial R&D stages because of high costs. Compared to developed countries, 
the Chinese government acts as a key driver for the renewable energy sector and 
offers the majority of R&D investment for enterprises. Thus, the Chinese 
government needs to consider appropriate policies to encourage enterprises’ 
intentions to increase the funding of R&D.  
Our research findings showed that the relationship between enterprises’ property 
rights and government subsidies is significant at the 1% level. The relationship 
between owners’ political networks and government subsidies is also significant in 
the t-1 and t-2 lagged periods (p<.01). This means that owners’ personal political 
connections play a role in obtaining government subsidies. In practice, enterprises 
don’t have an equal opportunity to obtain government funding, particularly in China 
where the institutional environment is distinctive. Further, we found that a firm’s 
  18 
political background and network also demonstrates an important role in obtaining 
other types of funding, such as bank loans (Li et al., 2008). As a result, more and 
more Chinese firms in the renewable energy industry are willing to spend 
considerable effort in establishing relationships with different Chinese government 
departments. 
In order to further examine the influence of firm ownership attributes, we divided 
the sample into two groups (state-owned and non-state-owned). Through descriptive 
statistics, we found that the average amount of government subsidies for the 
state-owned group and the non-state-owned group are 3637.336 and 1580.175 ten 
thousand Chinese Yuan, respectively. The average intensity of government subsidies 
is similar in both groups:  0.010 and 0.019 for the state-owned group and for the non 
state-owned group, respectively. Thus, our research findings suggest that ownership 
attributes have a weak effect on helping firms to obtain government subsidies.  
 
Please Insert Table 5 in Here 
 
We found that the nature of firm ownership directly determines the effect of 
government subsidies on firms’ R&D investment behavior. For example, for a 
state-owned new energy firm, the incentive effect of government subsidies on the 
firm’s R&D activities in the current period is 0.533, with a significant level of 1%. 
However, this effect was significantly reduced for a non-state-owned new energy 
firm. Our empirical findings found that lagged government subsidies for a firm 
during one period have a significant crowding-out effect on the firm’s R&D 
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investment:-1.396 for the state-owned group and -0.355 for the non-state-owned 
group (p<.01). The different effects (i.e. incentive vs. crowding-out) for these two 
types of firms may be due to organizational heterogeneity.  
4.3. Results of the threshold estimation 
Estimation of two threshold values is shown in Table 6. Single and double threshold 
effects were both found at the significant level of 1%, while the triple threshold effect 
was not significant. Threshold values of government subsidy intensity (i.e. 0.6% and 
10.1%) were achieved by bootstrap estimation. According to the two threshold values, 
government subsidies could be divided into three groups including low subsidy (less 
than 0.6%), medium subsidy (greater than 0.6% and less than 10.1%) and high 
subsidy (greater than 10.1%).  
 
Please Insert Table 6 in Here 
Please Insert Table 7 in Here 
Please Insert Table 8 in Here 
 
According to the three intervals divided by each threshold, the contribution of the 
degree of government subsidies for firms’ innovation investment was significant at 
the 5% level (see Table 7). When the intensity of government subsidy was less than 
0.6%, government funding support behavior showed a significant crowding-out effect 
(i.e. -0.315, p<0.001) on a firm’s R&D investment activities associated with slight 
marginal effects. Our empirical data show that if government subsidy intensity 
reached 0.6%, the crowding-out effect disappeared and a significant incentive effect 
of government subsidies (i.e. 0.139***) on the firm’s R&D investment activities was 
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created until government subsidy intensity exceeded 10.1%. In addition, prior 
marginal effect reaches maximum value. We see that when government subsidy 
intensity exceeded 10.1%, the government subsidies demonstrated a crowding-out 
effect again on the firm’s R&D investment activities and the contribution degree was 
-0.259***. 
5. Discussion 
The results of our data analysis show that the effect of government subsidies on 
increasing enterprises' intention to invest in R&D is an inverted-U relationship. 
Moreover, firm owners will play an important role in helping a firm to obtain 
government subsidies if they have substantial political resources. Thus, in the 
renewable energy industry, we suggest that enterprises with poor political 
backgrounds should actively foster R&D activities and improve their own innovative 
capabilities, which may help to overcome the discrimination of government in 
obtaining funding. To increase the effectiveness of government subsidies, we 
recommend that governments should improve funding allocation mechanisms and 
place an emphasis on assessing applicant’s research competency and innovative 
capability. Third, the two identified threshold effects (i.e. 0.6% and 10.1%) confirm 
the non-linear relationship between the intensity of government subsidies and its 
practical effect on increasing a firm’s intention to do private R&D activities. In sum, 
our research findings fully support our hypotheses. Government subsidies create a 
crowding-out effect followed by an incentive effect. A crowding-out effect will 
appear again once the government subsidy intensity increases. This means that 
government should consider how to develop an appropriate subsidy policy for 
renewable energy enterprises, adapting to the dynamic characteristics of the subsidy 
effects. The Chinese government needs to avoid the ‘Matthew effect’ (Merton, 1968; 
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Antonelli & Crespi, 2013) when implementing government subsidies.  
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This research makes several contributions, from both practical and theoretical 
perspectives. First, we examine the effect of government subsidies on micro 
innovative activities of renewable energy enterprises, and find that government 
subsidies have a significant crowding-out influence on enterprises' R&D investment 
behavior. Second, the moderating role of the political and institutional background of 
enterprises in the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D 
investment is examined. Our research shows that the relationship between a firm’s 
ownership and obtained government subsidies reaches a statistically significant level 
of 10% with a 0.341 value. The relationship between firm owners’ political resources 
and government subsidies is at a significant level of 1% during the t-1 and t-2 lagged 
periods. Third, this research employs the non-standard asymptotic theory of inference 
and the bootstrap method to examine how the influence of government subsidies on 
new energy enterprises’ R&D investment varies in accordance with the supporting 
degree of subsidies. The effect of government subsidies on increasing enterprises' 
intention to invest in R&D demonstrates an inverted-U relationship. 
There are several limitations in this research. First, we only employ a semiannual 
panel dataset over the period from June 2009 to December 2014. Our research is 
based on this short panel dataset since the Wind database only records R&D data for 
the sample since 2009. Second, we don’t further examine the incentive effect of 
subsidies on stimulating private R&D investment based on different subsidy types. 
  22 
We believe that such a comparison among different kinds of subsidies is a possible 
avenue for future research. 
The Chinese government is playing a pivotal role in promoting the development 
of renewable energy. An appropriate implementation of subsidy policies is essential 
for the growth and innovation of strategic emerging industries (SEIs). Some studies 
suggest that government subsidies have a crowding-out influence on enterprises’ 
R&D investment while others noted that government subsidies have a positive 
impact on enterprises’ own R&D investment. In this research, we employ estimations 
of pooled OLS, fixed effect, and random effect models to examine government 
subsidies’ influence on the R&D investment of renewable energy enterprises. The 
moderating effect of ownership attributes on the above relationship was examined as 
well. We employed a panel threshold model to investigate the threshold effects of 
subsidy intensity on the relationship between government subsidies and enterprises’ 
R&D investment. 
A panel data consisted of 147 Chinese renewable energy enterprises from 2009 to 
2014. Our empirical findings show that government subsidies have a significant 
crowding-out effect on new energy enterprises and have no incentive effect. Second, 
the moderating effect of enterprise owners’ background characteristics on the 
relationship between government subsidies and enterprises’ R&D investment was 
significant. Third, for enterprises with different ownership attributes, government 
subsidies have different effects on firms’ private R&D investment. For example, 
government subsidies have a remarkable incentive effect on state-owned renewable 
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energy enterprises’ R&D investment. However, a notable crowding-out effect for 
government subsidies on state-owned renewable energy enterprises’ intention to 
increase private R&D investment was found. Finally, estimation results of the panel 
threshold model show that government subsidies have a nonlinear relationship with 
enterprise innovation investment. The influence of government subsidies on 
enterprise innovation investment will vary in accordance with government subsidy 
intensity. Generous government subsidies don’t always result in incentive effects on 
renewable energy enterprises’ private R&D investment.  
Our empirical findings provide some policy implications. Considering a positive 
or negative effect on motivating renewable energy enterprises’ R&D investment with 
the change of ownership and business background of enterprises, the Chinese 
government should apply appropriate government subsidy policies to enterprises with 
different business characteristics (e.g., a firm’s business scale and development stage). 
For example, compared with private firms, the effect of government subsidies on 
increasing a university-run enterprise’s intention forR&D investment should be 
obvious. This may be attributed to the fact that such kinds of firms (i.e. university-run 
enterprises) have a strong scientific research foundation and resources. Thus, it seems 
appropriate for governments to place an emphasis on increasing funding support for 
university-run enterprises.  
This research also has some implications for policy implementations from the 
perspective of incentive mechanisms. According to our research findings, government 
subsidies indeed help enterprises that experience a serious shortage of specialized 
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research funding. Our study shows that enterprises with strong political background 
are likely to receive considerable government subsidies. It is necessary to improve 
current supervision mechanisms in order to reduce the possibility of senior managers’ 
rent-seeking behavior. On the one hand, ensuring that the usage of subsidies is in 
accordance with relevant provisions and that information on government subsidies is 
fully disclosed to the public is imperative for the public supervision. Relevant 
government departments need to evaluate the efficiency of annual government 
subsidies, and keep on examining the usage of government subsidies. In order to 
reduce the possibilities of rent-seeking behavior, government departments should 
promote collective decision-making instead of individual decision-making. 
The last contribution to policy of our research is how to identify suitable subsidy 
intensity. Our study shows that government subsidies do not always play an active 
role in improving the R&D capability of a firm, particularly in the later development 
stage of the firm. In other words, our research findings suggest that government 
should gradually reduce subsidy for a firm’s R&D activities in the renewable energy 
industry as the firm develops. Other subsidy information including supporting 
duration and expected outcomes should be made clear as soon as possible.  
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Table 1. Definition of variables 
 
 the amount of renewable energy enterprise R&D Expenditure 
,i tGS  the amount of government R&D subsidies for enterprise i in the period t 
, 1i tGS −  the amount of government R&D subsidies for enterprise i in the first 
lagged period of period t. 
, 2i tGS −  the amount of government R&D subsidies for enterprise i in the second 
lagged periods of period t. 
 
the amount of business income of enterprise i in the period t; 
 
shares of the largest shareholder of enterprise i in the period t 
 
return on assets of enterprise i in the period t 
Scalenum the number of employees  
CT Dummy variable that takes 1 representing the weakest political 
connections and 7 representing the strongest political connections. 
PR Dummy variable that takes 1 if enterprises are state-owned, otherwise 0 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
R&D input(ten thousand ) 4103.802 8128.015 0 128959.900 
GS(ten thousand) 2289.681 5772.743 0 84270.030 
Income（ten thousand） 156790.600 236411.200 0 2599373 
Topshare（%） 32.876 15.000 0 86.830 
ROA (%) 5.609 5.740 -68.064 48.979 
Scalenum（individuals） 2326.542 2511.418 42 19682 
CT 3.742 1.520 1 7 
PR 0.350 0.477 0 1 
 
 
R& Dput it
,i tincom e
,i ttopshare
,i tr o a
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Table 3. Pairwise correlations coefficients  
 
Variables R&Dinput GS GS_lag GS_la
g2 
Income Scalenum Topshare ROA CT PR CTGSlag2 CTGSlag GSPR 
R&Dinput     1.0000             
GS 0.400 
0.000 
1.000            
GS_lag 0.214 
0.000 
0.435 
0.000 
1.000           
GS_lag2 0.385 
0.000 
0.521 
0.000 
0.550 
0.000 
1.000          
Income 0.735 
0.000 
0.483 
0.000 
0.273 
0.000 
0.465 
0.000 
1.000         
Scalenum 0.506 
0.000  
0.323 
0.000   
0.328 
0.000  
0.323 
0.000   
0.541 
0.000 
1.000        
Topshare -0.020 
0.421 
0.161 
0.000 
0.163 
0.000 
0.161 
0.000 
0.129 
0.000  
-0.061 
0.009 
1.000       
ROA 0.099 
0.000 
0.110 
0.000 
-0.027 
0.258 
0.116 
0.000 
  0.087 
0.000 
-0.053 
0.017 
0.093 
0.000 
1.000      
   CT 0.160 
0.000  
-0.032 
0.154 
-0.034 
0.149 
-0.036 
0.138 
0.016 
0.485 
0.114 
0.000 
-0.042 
0.068 
-0.044 
0.048 
1.000     
PR 0.143 
0.000 
0.169 
0.000 
0.170 
0.000 
0.171 
0.000 
0.307 
0.000 
0.205 
0.000 
0.231 
0.000 
-0.150 
0.000 
-0.074 
0.001  
1.000    
 
CTGSlag2 0.544 
0.000 
0.763 
0.000 
0.582 
0.000 
0.627 
0.000 
0.505 
0.000 
0.397 
0.000 
0.113 
0.000 
0.103 
0.000 
0.125  
0.000  
0.148 
0.000 
1.000   
CTGSlag 0.261 
0.000 
0.590 
0.000 
0.637 
0.000 
0.601 
0.000 
0.338 
0.000 
0.316 
0.000 
0.204 
0.000 
-0.031 
0.188 
-0.004 
0.876 
0.282 
0.000 
0.539 
0.000 
1.000  
GSPR   0.387 
0.000 
0.744 
0.000 
0.486 
0.000 
0.677 
0.000 
0.560 
0.000 
0.234 
0.000 
0.251 
0.000 
0.056 
0.013 
-0.055 
0.013 
0.378 
0.000 
0.585 
0.000 
0.588 
0.000 
1.000 
 
  34 
 
Table 4. Regression results of property nature, government subsidy and 
innovation investment of new energy enterprises 
 
Variable Heteroscedasticity 
robust model 
GS -0.038 (0.652) 
, 1i tGS −  -0.660*** 
, 2i tGS −
 
 
-1.098*** 
 0.022*** 
 
-48.441* 
 31.233(0.212) 
 1.105*** 
CT -700.565*** 
PR -2135.144*** 
, 2 *CTi tGS −  0.209*** 
, 1 *CTi tGS −  0.170*** 
GS*PR 0.341* 
_cons 3528.682* 
R-squared 0.664 
Adj. R-squared 0.661 
N 1764 
F 53.88 
Note: The estimation method of is heteroscedastisity robust type model. * p<0.1，** p<0.05，*** p<0.01。 
 
 
  
,i tincome
,i ttopshare
,i troa
,i tscalenum
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Table 5. Government subsidy effect on R&D investment of enterprises with 
different ownerships  
 
Variable 
(R&D investment) 
State-owned 
group (PR=1) 
Non state-owned group 
(PR=0) 
GS 0.533*** -0.023(0.320) 
GS_lag1 -1.396*** -0.355*** 
GS_lag2 -1.041*** -0.832** 
income 0.018*** 0.028*** 
topshare -3.502(0.967) -37.700* 
roa -104.530(0.302) 2.137(0.889) 
scalenum 1.349*** 0.683*** 
CTGSlag 0.252*** 0.071** 
CT 1563.484* -1030.986*** 
CTGSlag2 0.201*** 0.169** 
_cons -14891.8*** 6592.272*** 
R-squared 0.6932 0.6498 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6861 0.6462 
N 444 1011 
F 61.45  109.02 
                                        Note: *represents p<0.1，**p<0.05，***p<0.01 
 
 
Table 6. Bootstrap of threshold effects 
 
Threshold 
model 
             Critical value 
F value P value 1% 5% 10% 
Single 86.365*** 0.002 34.624 9.019 4.272 
Double 58.671*** 0.000 9.912 3.501 2.108 
Triple 34.922 0.112 10.509 3.299 2.030 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Estimation results of threshold value 
 
Threshold value Estimation value 95% confidence interval 
First one  0.006 （0.005 0.006） 
Second one  0.101 (0.101 0.101) 
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Table 8. Estimation results of threshold effect of government subsidies on firms’ 
R&D investment  
 
Explanatory value 
(R&D investment) 
Threshold model 
income 0.0263*** 
scalenum 1.445*** 
topshare - 9.251 
roa 0.602 
Govsupport 0.203*** 
CT -299.267** 
PR -931.558 
GS_lag_1 -0.315*** 
GS_lag _2 0.139*** 
GS_lag _3 -0.259*** 
_cons -593.595 
F value 284.590 
Fixed effects test F=10.30    Prob> F 
=0.0000 
 
